The Primary Factors and Dynamics of the Civil War in Somalia

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The Primary Factors and Dynamics of the Civil War in Somalia

(November 2015)

Introduction

On 10 September 2012, the federal parliament of Somalia elected Hassan Sheike Mohamud as the president of the Federal Government of Somalia. He is the first president of the permanent central government in the country since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. However the government is still unable to exercise its valid control over the entire territory. The federal government, backed by African Union (AU) forces, only controls Mogadishu and some border areas. Vast areas of the territory are under control of Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin (Al-Shabaab). The human cost of the prolonged civil war has been massive. The casualty figures for Somalia’s civil war range from between 300,000 and 400,000 deaths (Mengisteab 2014). Furthermore, it is believed that two million Somali people were internally displaced and have become refugees as a result of the civil war (UNHCR 2015).
This essay will identify and assess the primary causes of the civil war in Somalia and dynamics of the civil war, and clarify the role of these factors in the continuation of the war. Particularly, this will be focussed on Southern Somalia issues and excluding issues of Somaliland and Puntland. I will firstly identify structural and contributing causes of the large-scale violence in 1991-1992. I will argue that competition for power / resources and state repression are the structural causes, and clan identities, international influences and economic failures are the contributing causes. Secondly, I will examine the dynamics through the civil war and the current issues.



Structural Causes
The year of Barre’s ouster was a ‘key shift’ of Somalia’s conflict and the shift spawned the civil war that continues today. Before 1991, violence used as ‘political instrument’ which had been exercised on the institutions of the state. However, the breakdown of the regime changed the character of the violence. (Kapteijns 2013). After the collapse, Anti-Barre groups which were based on clan identities lost their direction and started to hate each other (Makinda 1993). As a result, clan-based violence flooded into a life of ordinary Somalis. Shortly, Somalis engaged in the capricious conflict and became ‘targets’ as well as ‘perpetrators’ (Kapteijns 2013). The violence was exercised in the name of a clan, however the clan identity is not a single cause of the violence. Characterisation of the conflict as inter clan violence might unable to provide better understanding of the violence. In fact, it will be more helpful to consider that competition for power/resources is the most important factor that caused the Somalia’s conflict (Elmi and Braise 2006). Since political entrepreneurs manipulate clan identities in order to mobilise Somalis into their competition (Gajraj et al. 2005). Moreover, state repression during barre’s dominion generate spread of armed struggle (Makinda 1993, Adam 1999, Elmi and Braise 2006).

Competition for Power and Resources 
Clan-based militias’ unity and conflict is depending on competition for power and resources. Traditionally clans competed for grazing or water, commercial control in towns (Lewis 2008). In independent and urbanised Somalia, however types of resources and a rule of competition have changed. Countries’ resources and foreign aid became under control of a state (Elmi and Braise 2006). As a result of this, clans as traditional unit were politicised themselves and the leaders started to clash for the power. However, these political entrepreneurs are not parochial clan chiefs or pastoral elders. They are ambitious people ‘who have quickly adapted to the new rules of the game of competition for power’ (Compagnon 1998: 83). Once those political entrepreneurs won the power, they personalised it. A notable example of this is Siad Barre. When he assumed the state power in 1969, numerous corruptions were committed by the relatives and friends with ‘a direct access to power to appoint, transfer, sack or even jail’ (Compagnon 1992: 8-9). Thus Somalia’s patrimonialism had been intensified gradually and a difference between public and private good had become blurred (Compagnon 1998).
January 1991, a battle between the military regime and the United Somali Congress (USC) guerrillas for Mogadishu ended with the expulsion of Siad Barre. Power was hurriedly claimed by the Hawiye and Ali Mahdi Mohamad was appointed as an interim president without consulting USC leaderships and other anti-Barre groups. As the Hawiye clan base centred, the USC was formed in 1989. The USC might be divided into two main sub-clan factions; the Abgal group led by Ali Mahdi and Habar Gidir group led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed (Lewis 2008). Shortly after Mahdi proclaimed as interim president, Mogadishu became a battlefield of the power struggle between Aideed group and Mahdi Group. The struggle escalated into a full-scale war after the Djibouti National Reconciliation Conference in November 1991 (Kapteijns 2013) and it was the first war throughout history of two clans which belong to the same Hawiye clan (Elmi and Braise 2006). The USC split was a trigger of the civil war, moreover the inter-USC conflict was extraordinarily brutal among history of Somalia’s civil war (Kapteijns 2013). From the examples of Barre and the USC, it can be seen that the competition for power and resources in a chaotic condition was a crucial cause of the civil war and it postponed development in all sectors of Somalia.

State Repression
On the first decade of Barre’s rule, no armed opposition was attempted. As ‘most Somalis hoped that the regime would allow room for peaceful protest’ (Adam 1999: 176). However, the situation of the late 1970s, altered opponents into a member of armed factions. When Ambitious invasion of Ethiopia ended in a defeat of Somali forces, Barre blamed the military for the result and executed a large number of officers. Some military officers attempted coup in 1978 hostile to the death penalty. His response was using national army and police to suppress the coup and punish civilians who has same clan background with the officers (Elmi and Braise 2006). The repression resulted in the establishment of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) by escaping member of the failed coup. It is the first guerrilla opposition group on the history of the conflict.
Punishment for the opposition was always harsh, even some years before the Barre’s fall. In May 1988, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) crossed the Ethiopia-Somalia border and attacked Hargeisa and Burco of north-western Somalia, Barre’s regime completely destroyed two towns with the national army and killed innocent civilians. Even after SNM’s withdraw, the national army kept devastating these towns (Kapteijns 2013). Barre’s repressive state not only destroyed mechanisms for expressing grievance of the opposition (Elmi and Braise 2006) but also it helped rebel leaders to mobilise their clan members in armed forces against the state. This formed the basis of civil war outbreak in 1991 (Adam 1999).



Contributing Causes

Clan Identities
Since Somalia consisted with the same ethnic group, ethnicity is not a factor. Instead of ethnicity, most of the actors in the Somalia’s conflict are described by a name of clans or sub-clans. Clans traditionally, were too large and decentralised to form a political unit. Moreover, they often split into several sub-clans as a result of nomadic movement of their members (Lewis 2008). These nonstatic clan identities are depending on a situation, furthermore the flexibility of clan identities has been politically instrumental for mobilising forces since the independence (Lewis 2008, Elmi & Braise 2006).
Somali clans before the civil war, had often collided over resources and ‘the elders’ settled these conflicts using a joint treaty or contract (Her) (Lewis 2008). In contrast, the situation of 1980s-1990 shows changes in a nature of the clan relations. In 1980, Barre was deeply relying on three sub-clans of the Darod, called ‘M.O.D’ (Marrehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante clan). Concurrently with marginalisation of other clans. Marginalised clans developed their grievance to the political group. In 1990, a year before Barre’s ouster, three clan-based forces (the SNM, the SPM and the USC) formed an alliance for fighting Barre. After the achievement of their goal, however, they no longer had common ground and started to loathe each other (Makinda 1993). Besides, when the USC assumed the state power, ‘clan cleansing’ began against the Darod clan, including “the elders” (Kapteijns 2013). Clan identities definitely contributed to the conflict as an instrument for mobilisation (Elmi and Braise 2006) and to escalate a level of the conflict.

International Influences
The availability of weapons in the 1990s has commonly been assumed that a result of international involvement in Somalia. Because of a geopolitical importance of the horn of Africa during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had provided Barre’s regime with large quantities of aid and weapons. While the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia allowed the armed opposition groups to establish their bases in Ethiopia and provided arms and training (Markakis 1998). Both the regime and the opposition acquired resources from the outside (Kapteijns 2013). The ending of the Cold War and following withdrawal of foreign aid weaken the regime (Bradbury and Healy 2010). At that time, Barre’s regime was not able to remain without support outside.
In 1991, on the brink of the collapse, the Djibouti government was the only external actor who concerned about peace in Somalia (Bradbury and Healy 2010). At the moment, the most influential neighbour country, Ethiopia support armed factions aiming for the weak and divided Somalia (Elmi and Braise 2006), while International attention focused on the Gulf War and Balkan conflict. The first UN operation was only beginning in April 1992, when the ‘clan cleansing’ already finished. In other words, International involvement and indifferent both contributed to the outbreak of the civil war.

Economic Failures
Since failures of the productive economy and the large number of unemployment, looting prevailing among Somalis. Moreover a group of businessmen who made a fortune from looting deeply related to armed factions and added fuel to the conflict. This is evident in the case of two important faction leader of the USC; Ali Mahdi and Osman Atto. They were both the businessmen and faction leaders (Compagnon 1998). Hopeless population additionally provided human resources to the factions (Elmi and Braise 2006).



Dynamics of the civil war

International Intervention 1992-1995
When Somalia suffered from severe famine in the aftermath of the civil war and drought in 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOMⅠ). The operation only aimed to monitor sustain the Mogadishu ceasefire and to protect aid workers. It was continued to function during U.S.-led force known as United Task Force (UNITAF)’s mandate. UNITAF also conducted only the protection of the relief convoys despite overwhelming military superiority. UNOSOMⅠ and UNITAF definitely saved many people from starvation. However, they failed to reduce the degree of violence, to end the civil war, and to “restore hope” (Adam 1999). UNITAF lasted until May 1993, succeeded by UNOSOMⅡ. On 5 June 1993, Twenty-four Pakistani blue berets were killed during operation of inspecting some of Aideed’s arms stores. Admiral Howe, the head of UNOSOM declared war on Aideed and authorised helicopter gunship strikes on Aideed’s bases in Mogadishu. In October, Aideed’s forces brought down American helicopters by PRGs, and eighteen American soldiers were killed in the incident. The ‘Black Hawk Down’ changed U.S. policy on Somalia. The U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that All U.S. operations would quit Somalia by March 1994. UNOSOMⅡ was disbanded in March 1995. Meanwhile, UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 failed to make appreciable outcomes.
During the foreign intervention from 1992 to 1995, only few dynamics are observed. The clan-based factions and their conflicts were as strong as ever, for example, Mahdi and Aideed recovered from intense fighting between 1991 and 1992 under the UN patronage (Compagnon 1998). Besides, the withdrawal of international engagement did not drag Somalia into a deadly conflict. By the late 1990s, the situation of Somalia was ‘neither war nor peace’, as councils of elders and Islamic courts produced development in security (Bradbury and Healy 2010).

Failures of Transitional Governments and Rise of Islamic Courts.
International engagement returned in 2000. The President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Geele, hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta. And the conference produced the Transitional National Government (TNG) supported by the UN, some Arab states and domestic groups. The President of the TNG, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan developed Islamist orientation and supported unity of a Hawiye clan (Lewis 2008), however the TNG never recognised by the Somali public as their government. Moreover, it was opposed by the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) which was supported by Ethiopia. When the nominal TNG replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in November 2004, Somalia’s leadership shifted from the Mogadishu-centred, Hawiye and Islamist dominated coalition to the federalist, Darod clan and Ethiopian backed coalition (Bradbury and Healy 2010). While the TFG was repeatedly proclaimed their legitimacy by UN and EU, though they never managed to control over all of Mogadishu until 2011, Islamic Courts controlled Mogadishu and much of the south-central Somalia (Vidino et al. 2010). Later, the courts established the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006.
Islamic courts have sprung up throughout the country after the Barre’s ouster in response to local desire of for law and order. Consequently, the courts are deeply related with local clan and businessmen (Menkhaus 2002). The rise of the courts generally understood to be distinct from local militant Islamic organisation represented by Al-Ittihad al-Islami or global organisation such as Al-Qaeda (Menkhaus 2002). The courts were based on the local traditional Sufi practice, therefore they uninterested in an Islamic State and strict interpretation of Islam (Menkhaus 2002, Vidino et al. 2010). However, when U.S. at ‘War on terror’ and Ethiopia’s Christian regime allies patronised the TFG against the ICU, religion finally became an important factor of Somalia’s conflict. In other word, the civil war might be sacralised by the international intervention (Vidino 2010).

Advent of Al-Shabaab 
In 2006, the ICU forces besieged the TFG area, and the TFG requested Ethiopia for military deployment. Consequently, heavily armed Ethiopian forces with U.S. complicity undermined the ICU and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. After the TFG’s occupation of the city, the TFG and Ethiopian army assaulted Hawiye citizens, so called ‘Islamists’ (Lewis 2008). The situation of the TFG was parallel to the situation of Barre in the late 1980s; dependence upon external supports, “Clan cleansing” and reinforcement of the oppositions. The invasion by the old enemy arouse the amalgamation of global Islamists and nationalists (Vidino 2010) and Al-Shabaab finally splinted off from the ICU.
Al-Shabaab claim to be ‘conducting a Jihad against all non-Somali, non-Muslim forces, ideas and influences in the country and beyond’ (Ibrahim 2010: 289). Al-Shabaab moreover, has been the only organisation that can provide basic civil services and has built its legitimacy in many areas of Somalia (Mwangi 2012).
Since then, Al-Shabaab has become the major competitor to the government in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab has attacked the TFG, Ethiopian and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and occupied over vast areas of the territory. The rise of Al-Shabaab shifted the perspective of civil war from local interests to a ‘Glocal’ outlook (Vidino 2010). Moreover, it has changed the contributing factors of the civil war. Firstly, clan identities have been eroded by Al-Shabaab’s strategy. The strategy raised Somali nationalism and xenophobia, also successfully managed of the negative effects of clannism (Mwangi 2012). Secondly, international influences have become crucial factor. When Al-Shabaab began to attack a mainland of external actors, the civil war battlefield became ubiquitous. Lastly, economic failure still provides human resources to Al-Shabaab. Since Al-Shabaab pays its fighters and suicide bombers compensation to their family, Al-Shabaab might secure a steady supply of its supporters (Mwangi 2012).



Conclusion
In the first and second part of this essay, I outlined the causes of Somalia’s civil war. I argued that the competition for power/resources and the state repression were the structural causes of the civil war. I also discussed that the clan identities, the international influences and the economic failures have intensified the civil war.
In the absence of a functioning state since the ouster of Barre, the major actors of Somalis conflict have lacked legitimacy, thus they desperately depended on the clan identities or the outside support in pursuit of the power and resources. These unsuitable power holders have reproduced the conflict.
In the last part, I traced the dynamics of the civil war from the UN intervention in 1992 to the rise of Al-Shabaab. During the international intervention, only few dynamics are observed. However, the rise of the Islamic courts and the sacralisation of the civil war generated alteration of the factors. Al-Shabaab has enhanced its legitimacy by re-establishment of civil services and employment of people. Clan identities have now receded and Al-Shabaab conduct Global Jihadist movement against U.S. and contributing countries of the AMISOM.







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